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2018 STUART ROME LECTURE:
ORIGINS OF AND POTENTIAL
SOLUTIONS TO HIGH PRESCRIPTION
DRUG PRICES IN THE U.S.
AARON S. KESSELHEIM, M.D., J.D., M.P.H.
I. INTRODUCTION
Prescription drug prices are one of the fastest rising health care costs,
becoming an increasing burden for patients and our health care system. The
essential policy dilemma is that while drugs are among the most cost-effective
interventions in medicine and the drug industry plays an important role in
bringing these products forward—a process that can require substantial
resources—increasing drug prices in the U.S. can make important breakthroughs
unaffordable to many of our patients. Since high drug prices can lead to poor
clinical consequences and have become a major driver in U.S. health care
spending, this review is intended to provide an overall landscape of U.S.
prescription drug spending, to address widely discussed explanations for high
drug prices, and finally to review some proposed interventions and policy
solutions.
II. BACKGROUND
Prescription drug spending in the U.S. rose 12% in 2015 and another 6% in
2016.1 Total drug spending in 2016 was $450 billion, which accounted for about
22% of health care spending, 19% of Medicare spending, and 19% of employerbased insurance benefits.2 Some health insurance companies have reported that
© 2019 Aaron S. Kesselheim.
 The author is an Associate Professor of Medicine, Harvard Medical School; Director, Program
On Regulation, Therapeutics, And Law (PORTAL), Division of Pharmacoepidemiology and
Pharmacoeconomics, Department of Medicine, Brigham and Women’s Hospital. Dr. Kesselheim’s work
is funded by the Laura and John Arnold Foundation, as well as the Engelberg Foundation and the HarvardMIT Center for Regulatory Science. Dr. Kesselheim would like to thank Emily Jung, A.B., for her help in
organizing this article.
1. IQVIA INST. FOR HUMAN DATA SCI., MEDICINES USE AND SPENDING IN THE U.S.: A REVIEW OF
2016 AND OUTLOOK TO 2021 6 (2017).
2. See IQVIA INST. FOR HUMAN DATA SCI., MEDICINES USE AND SPENDING IN THE U.S.: A REVIEW
OF 2016 AND OUTLOOK TO 2021 6 (2017); https://www.iqvia.com/institute/reports/medicines-use-andspending-in-the-us-a-review-of-2016 (describing total drug and health care spending in the United States);
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drugs now account for one of every four dollars they spend on health care.3 U.S.
drug prices and spending far exceed those of other similar industrialized
countries around the world. For example, countries like Canada, Germany,
France, and Australia, all of which have excellent health care systems, on average
spend about $400 per capita compared to the $850 the U.S. spends per capita on
prescription drugs.4 The main driver of prescription drug spending is brand-name
drugs, which make up only about 10% of prescriptions but three-quarters of drug
spending.5 Prescription drug prices overall have been increasing substantially
over the last decade. There was a 208% increase in prices of the most commonly
used brand-name drugs from 2008 to 2016, a 12% increase in the Consumer Price
Index, and a 28% increase in aggregate health care spending.6
This is not a new phenomenon, as one study found that brand-name cancer
drug launch prices have been rising exponentially over the last 50 years.7 But in
recent years, we have seen that increases in drug prices are also not limited to
brand-name products. In 2015, Turing Pharmaceuticals raised the price of
pyrimethamine (Daraprim), a decades-old drug for patients with an infection that
can sometimes arise among patients with reduced immune systems such as endstage HIV infection, from $13.50 to $750 a pill.8 Overall, generic drugs are still
extremely inexpensive and among the most economical products in the U.S.

MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE AND THE HEALTH
CARE DELIVERY SYSTEM 109 (2016), http://www.medpac.gov/docs/default-source/reports/june-2016report-to-the-congress-medicare-and-the-health-care-delivery-system.pdf?sfvrsn=0
(describing
breakdown of Medicare spending in the U.S.); see also Drew Altman, Prescription Drugs’ Sizable Share
of Health Spending, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (Dec. 13, 2015), https://www.kff.org/healthcosts/perspective/prescription-drugs-sizable-share-of-health-spending/; Drew Altman, Prescription
Drugs’ Sizable Share of Health Spending, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 13, 2015),
https://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/12/13/prescription-drugs-sizable-share-of-health-spending/
(explaining health care spending for employer-based insurance benefits).
3. Michael Sherman et al., Prescription Medicines Account for One in Four Dollars Spent by a
Commercial
Health
Plan,
HEALTH
AFF.
BLOG
(Aug.
24
2018),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180821.820628/full/.
4. Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., The High Cost of Prescription Drugs in the United States: Origins
and Prospects for Reform, 316 JAMA 858, 859 (2016).
5. Id. at 860.
6. EXPRESS SCRIPTS, 2016 DRUG TREND REPORT 31 (2017) (providing a graph that depicts the
208% increase); Aaron S. Kesselheim, et al., The High Cost of Prescription Drugs in the United States:
Origins and Prospects for Reform, 316 JAMA 858, 860 (2016) (describing a nationwide hike in the price
index of prescription medications).
7. Peter B. Bach, Monthly and Median Costs of Cancer Drugs at the Time of FDA Approval, 19652015, MEMORIAL SLOAN KETTERING CANCER CENT., https://www.mskcc.org/research-programs/healthpolicy-outcomes/cost-drugs (last visited Nov. 9, 2018).
8. Andrew Pollack, Drug Goes From $13.50 a Tablet to $750, Overnight, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/business/a-huge-overnight-increase-in-a-drugs-priceraises-protests.html.
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health care system. However, there are parts of the generic market that do not
work efficiently, leading to price hikes.
The clinical consequences of increasing drug prices are well-documented.
Studies have found that patients who were prescribed a costly brand name
product rather than a more affordable generic alternative adhered less well to
treatment and, as a result, had worse health outcomes.9,10 High prices are directly
felt by the millions of patients without prescription drug insurance, as well as by
patients with insurance via out-of-pocket costs. With rising prices leading to
increased insurance premiums, some insurers have implemented costcontainment strategies that have transferred more drug expenses onto patients’
shoulders through deductibles and co-payments.11 Medicaid programs, which do
not charge co-payments or substantial cost-sharing, have had to cut back on other
services and tighten eligibility requirements due to expanding prescription drug
budgets.12 According to a survey in 2016, about one in every five patients
reported that they, or another family member did not fill a prescription in the last
year due to costs.13
III. EXPLANATIONS FOR HIGH DRUG PRICES
Many reasons have been offered for why prescription drug prices have risen
so substantially in recent years. Some contend that these high prices are
connected to innovation in the field. Naturally, since brand-name drug
companies are involved in the development and testing of the investigational
drugs that are submitted to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), approved,
and then marketed, they play a major role in the innovation pathway and receive
much of the revenue that comes from these high prices. However, it is also
important to recognize the limitations of the claims that link high drug prices to
innovation. Many of the most transformative drugs that have come through in
the past few decades originated in publicly funded research, supported by the
National Institutes of Health and performed in academic medical centers.14 This
9. William H. Shrank et al., The Implications of Choice: Prescribing Generic or Preferred
Pharmaceuticals Improves Medication Adherence for Chronic Conditions, 166 ARCH INTERN MED. 332,
332–35 (2006).
10. Joshua J. Gagne et al., Comparative Effectiveness of Generic and Brand-Name Statins on Patient
Outcomes: A Cohort Study, 161 ANN INTERN MED. 400, 405 (2014).
11. Amy Kapczynski & Aaron S. Kesselheim, ‘Government Patent Use’: A Legal Approach to
Reducing Drug Spending, 35 HEALTH AFF. 791, 791–93 (2016).
12. Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., The High Cost of Prescription Drugs in the United States Origins
and Prospects for Reform, 316 JAMA 858, 864 (2016).
13. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL: HEALTH CARE
PRIORITIES FOR 2017 22 (2016), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Topline-Kaiser-Health-TrackingPollHealth-Care-Priorities-for-2017.
14. Aaron Kesselheim et al., The Roles of Academia, Rare Diseases, and Repurposing in the
Development of the Most Transformative Drugs, 34 HEALTH AFF. 286, 287, 291 (2015).
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work makes drug identification possible by uncovering the key science and
translational discoveries that make drug identification possible. In some cases,
scientists have been integrally involved in developing the products themselves;
developing monoclonal antibodies or taking drug samples through a proof of
concept testing before drug manufacturers get involved as a partner to help
finance and organize later-stage clinical trials. Large drug manufacturers spend
about 13 to 20% of their revenues on research and development.15 By contrast,
they spend 31% on sales, marketing and administration.16 One review estimated
that much of the direct investment in research by large drug manufacturers is
directed towards already-approved products, with approximately 2.2% being
invested in research that could lead to future transformative discoveries.17
Another common justification for high drug prices is that they derive from
high pre-approval clinical testing requirements. However, over the past few
decades, it has been increasingly easier to meet the FDA standards of efficacy
and safety for new drug approval. In the recent decade, about a third of all new
drugs are approved on the basis of a single pivotal trial. Two-thirds of drugs are
approved based on data from pivotal trials lasting six months or shorter, even if
the drugs are chronic disease medications intended to be taken by patients for
much longer.18 Half of all drugs are approved based on effects observed in
surrogate measures as opposed to actual clinical endpoints.19 Surrogate measures
are laboratory tests or other physical measurements that are easier to measure
and often occur before a clinical event may be expected. Drugs approved in
recent years are tested on average in fewer than one thousand patients in their
pivotal clinical trials.20
Furthermore, the FDA has a number of expedited development or approval
pathways for drugs that are particularly important, meet an unmet medical need,
or treat a serious or life-threatening condition. For example, drugs given a
Priority Review designation must be reviewed within six months, as compared
to the standard ten-month review period. In 2012, the Breakthrough Therapy
designation was created to move drugs through pre-approval testing as quickly
as possible. In recent years, about three-quarters of all newly approved drugs

15. Jerry Avorn, POWERFUL MEDICINES: THE BENEFITS, RISKS, & COSTS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS
205 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 2004).
16. Id.; Aaron S. Kesselheim, et al., The High Cost of Prescription Drugs in the United States:
Origins and Prospects for Reform, 316 JAMA, 858, 863 (2016).
17. Donald W. Light & Joel Lexchin, Foreign Free Riders and the High Price of US Medicines. 331
BMJ 958, 959 (2005).
18. Nicholas S. Downing, et. al., Clinical Trial Evidence Supporting FDA Approval of Novel
Therapeutic Agents, 2005-2012, 311 JAMA, 368, 369–72 (2015).
19. Id.
20. Id.
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qualified for one or more of these special pathways.21 Studies have found that
drugs in these pathways on average offer more quality-adjusted life years
(QALYs) than non-expedited drugs.22 However, it is also the case that lessinnovative second- and later-line drugs in a class are qualifying for one of these
pathways.23
These trends have made the FDA the fastest regulatory agency in the world
in terms of new drug approvals. The FDA’s new oncology drug approval review
times were found on average to be shorter than European Medicines Agency
review times. Novel therapeutics are now more likely to be approved in the U.S.
before being marketed in Europe or Canada.24 In recent years, nearly all
approved drugs are now being approved on the first cycle of review, illustrating
the FDA’s modern-day efficiency.25
Are drugs expensive simply because they impart good clinical value? The
Institute for Clinical and Economic Review (ICER) regularly conducts formal
value-based assessments of drugs, evaluates how effectively the drugs work, and
what the prices of alternative products are in order to determine whether the drug
is priced at a level that is reasonably consistent with its value.26 ICER’s
assessments have shown that while some expensive drugs are priced in line with
value, many are priced at levels much greater than their estimated value.27
The underlying reason for high drug prices is the U.S. allows
pharmaceutical manufacturers to charge whatever the market will bear. Indeed,
rather than being driven by innovation or FDA requirements, many
pharmaceutical manufacturers admit that prices are set based on what others are
setting; a commonly stated justification for high prices is that the prices of their

21. Jonathan J. Darrow et al., The FDA Breakthrough-Drug Designation- Four Years of
Experience, 378 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1444, 1445 (2018).
22. James D. Chambers et al., Drugs Cleared Through the FDA’s Expedited Review Offer Greater
Gains Than Drugs Approved by Conventional Process, 36 HEALTH AFF. 1408, 1408–14 (2017).
23. Aaron Kesselheim et al., Trends in Utilization of FDA Expedited Drug Development and
Approval Programs, 1987-2014: Cohort Study, BMJ, Aug. 17, 2015, at 5.
24. Nicholas S. Downing et al., Regulatory Review of Novel Therapeutics—Comparison of Three
Regulatory Agencies, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2284, 2290–91 (2012).
25. John K. Jenkins, Director, Office of New Drugs, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research,
CDER New Drug Review: 2015 Update at the FDA/CMS Summit (Dec. 14, 2015),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDE
R/UCM477020.pdf.
26. See generally, INST. FOR CLINICAL AND ECON. REV., https://icer-review.org/about/ (last visited
Nov. 9, 2018).
27. Id.; Peter B. Bach & Steven D. Pearson, Payer & Policy Maker Steps to Support Value–Based
Pricing for Drugs, 314 JAMA 2503, (2015) (discussing a review by ICER of 2 inhibitor drugs for high
cholesterol showing that a reasonable value–based price range of the long–term clinical benefits would be
lower than the annual price list).
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drugs are in line with other therapies or treatments.28 Exacerbating this problem
are strategies that undercut competition and hinder payors’ abilities to provide
counterweights that might reduce high prices; that is, the market will bear
excessive prices well out of proportion to the value that new drugs provide
because it is highly inefficient. In the next section, I will review how changes to
make competition more effective are among the most promising strategies for
bringing prices down to more reasonable levels.
IV. ADDRESSING HIGH DRUG PRICES IN THE U.S. MARKET
Addressing inappropriately high drug prices requires different approaches
to each segment of a drug’s development course. After the pre-approval period—
since drug prices are not strongly associated with the cost of drug development—
the next three major time segments are the brand-name market exclusivity
period, the transition to generic competition, and the multisource market.
Interventions in these areas may affect drug prices, and I will review them in
turn.
A. Brand-Name Market Exclusivity Period
When the FDA approves a new drug, the law guarantees at least about six
to seven years of market exclusivity, during which time the FDA will not approve
any direct competitors, allowing manufacturers to establish prices.29 There are
some variations to the length of market exclusivity depending on the product
type. For example, certain antibiotics get an additional 5 years, and biologics get
twelve years.30 In addition to this guaranteed minimum period of market
exclusivity, brand-name drugs are protected by patents that last twenty years.31
The first patent on the underlying active ingredient is obtained around the time
the active ingredient is synthesized or discovered, and therefore a certain amount
of time remaining on it has usually expired by the time the drug reaches the
market. (This time is offset by patent term restoration that adds back to the patent

28. Aimee Picchi, The Cost of Biogen’s New Drug: $750,000 Per Patient, CBS NEWS MONEYWATCH
(Dec. 29, 2009, 2:00 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-cost-of-biogens-new-drug-spinraza750000-per-patient/ (noting that a pharmaceutical company claimed that a $750,000 price tag on a rare
disease drug is consistent with other therapies for rare diseases); Courtney Hutchison, Provenge Cancer
Vaccine: Can You Put a Price on Delaying Death?, ABC NEWS (July 29, 2010),
https://abcnews.go.com/Health/ProstateCancerNews/provenge-cancer-vaccine-months-life-worth100k/story?id=11269159; Judy Silber, Onyx Gets OK for Kidney Cancer Drug, CONTRA COSTA TIMES,
Dec. 21, 2005, at F4; Amy Dockser Marcus, Price Becomes Factor in Cancer Treatment, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 7, 2004, at D.1.
29. 21 C.F.R. § 314.108 (2016).
30. 21 U.S.C. § 355f(a) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A) (2010).
31. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2015).
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the time of FDA review and half the time of clinical development.)32 One study
found that on average new drugs get about 12 to 14 years of competition-free
exclusivity, while first-in-class drugs—often the most innovative products—get
on average about 14 to 15 years.33
During the market exclusivity period, there are important limits placed on
public and private payors that prevent them from negotiating effectively with
manufacturers. For example, Medicare, the government insurance program for
patients over age 65, covers about 45 million people and accounts for about a
third of the nation’s drug expenditure, but it does not use a national formulary or
negotiate drug prices on behalf of the individual Medicare Part D plans that
provide outpatient drug benefits to enrollees.34 There are also six protected drug
classes for which Medicare Part D plans have to cover all approved drugs, such
as drugs for cancer and mental illness. Although Part D plans can use formulary
management tools such as prior authorization, this rule undermines effective
price negotiation, since it is hard to negotiate an effective price if a Part D insurer
is forced by the federal govt to cover the drug, even if it is no better than one or
two or three similar products. Similarly, Medicaid, the federal- and state-based
insurance program for poor patients that covers about 75 million people, cannot
exclude most FDA-approved drugs from its formulary (it, too, can use formulary
management tools).35 As a result, while Medicaid is guaranteed a certain best
price based on what the drugs are sold for in the private market, states are often
unable to negotiate additional savings. Among the federal government payors,
the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has the most flexibility in terms of
setting its formulary and in negotiating on behalf of all its enrollees around the
country. As a result, the VA often pays far less for many drugs.
Private payors also have limitations on their abilities to negotiate prices.
One of the primary limitations is the lack of comparative effectiveness
information at the time of approval, which documents how effectively drugs
work compared to other drug or non-drug treatments on the market. In a sample
of 197 drugs approved in years 2000-2010, only half of the drugs had
comparative effectiveness information at the time of approval.36 Comparative
effectiveness information does not reliably emerge after approval either, since
there is no system for reliably generating such evidence. Formulary management

32. 35 U.S.C. §156(c) (2012).
33. Bo Wang et al., Research Letter: Variation in Time of Market Exclusivity among Top-Selling
Prescription Drugs in the United States, 175 JAMA 635, 636 (2015).
34. Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., The High Cost of Prescription Drugs in the United States: Origins
and Prospects for Reform, 316 JAMA 858, 862 (2016).
35. Id.
36. Nikolas H. Goldberg et al., Availability of Comparative Efficacy Data at the Time of Drug
Approval in the United States, 305 JAMA 1786, 1787 (2011).
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tools used by private insurers can also be undermined by manufacturers; for
example, as part of their promotional outreach, manufacturers have offered
coupons to patients that counteract increased cost-sharing levels or provided
physician offices with strategies to circumvent prior authorization paperwork. In
addition, some state laws require private payors to cover drugs, making it
difficult for payors to negotiate a reasonable price. For example, the National
Conference of State Legislatures conducted a study reviewing state laws and
found that about two-thirds of states required private payors to cover off-label
uses of cancer drugs.37
Possible solutions for improving competitive price negotiation during the
market exclusivity period include giving public payors greater latitude to use
formularies or tools like therapeutic substitution, which would allow these
payors to more efficiently direct patients to equally effective therapies that may
cost less. When implemented in an evidence-based and transparent way,
formulary tools may be useful in helping to provide greater leverage in the
negotiating process with the manufacturer. Authorizing Medicare to negotiate
prices for drugs has been widely suggested as an alternative solution that could
be accomplished by changing a specific part of the Medicare Part D statute.
However, economists have found that authorizing Medicare to negotiate drug
prices will likely lead to small savings without broader formulary oversight,
which can be included as part of that legislative change.38
In the private market, accountable care organizations are starting to emerge
that provide the opportunity to pair health services and drug costs; this allows
physicians to benefit from prescribing drugs optimally rather than from
prescribing expensive drugs that do not add value. Producing and actively
disseminating information about the clinical and economic value of drugs would
be helpful for individuals who are working on negotiating with private
manufacturers and payors. The Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute,
created in 2010, was originally conceived to conduct this value-based research
on drugs. However, the political process diverted it away from funding the kind
of comparative effectiveness research that would help private payors make
decisions in the pharmaceutical industry.39 Local interventions can include

37. See Karmen Hanson & Erik Bondurant, CANCER INSURANCE MANDATES AND EXCEPTIONS,
(Nat’l Conf. of St. Legis. eds., 2009) (stating the states that have off-label drug use as a cancer-related
benefit and offering).
38. See Juliette Cubanski & Tricia Neuman, Searching for Savings in Medicare Drug Price
Negotiations, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION 1, 3 (2018), http://files.kff.org/attachment/issue-briefsearching-for-savings-in-medicare-drug-price-negotiations.
39. See Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., The High Cost of Prescription Drugs in the United States: Origins
and Prospect for Reform, 316 JAMA 858, 866 (2016) (stating that Congress precluded Patient-Centered
Outcome Research Institute from considering drug prices, instead the Patient-Centered Outcome Research
Institute focused on patient engagement and decision aids).
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integrating value-based prescribing into physicians’ professional education,
setting up electronic medical record point-of-care reminders,40 or enhanced
institution-level decision-making. For example, Memorial Sloan Kettering
Cancer Center determined that the drug ziv-aflibercept was not cost-effective and
decided not to use it at its institution, resulting in the manufacturer giving the
Center a particularly high discount on the product to keep it on the institution’s
formulary.41
B. Brand-to-Generic Transition
The next period in the drug life cycle is the brand-to-generic transition
period. The only type of competition that consistently and substantially lowers
prescription drug prices comes from interchangeable generic drugs that emerge
after the market exclusivity period ends. State drug product selection laws then
facilitate the process of circulating generic drugs to patients by mandating or
authorizing pharmacists to fill a prescription with a generic drug. This can occur
even when a physician writes for a brand-name drug. Automatic substitution
helps generic manufacturers compete based on price and ensures that prices reach
closer to the cost of production.
However, this brand-to-generic transition period can be delayed or
prolonged. For example, the government provides an additional six months of
exclusivity if a manufacturer tests its drug with children.42 This incentive derives
its value from delaying generic entry. In addition, nearly all manufacturers seek,
and the federal government grants, dozens of additional patents on their drugs
during the course of development and the brand-name exclusivity period.43
Generic manufacturers must then sue to invalidate these patents before bringing
their drugs to market. Such secondary patents cover peripheral components of
the drug as well as different compositions, formulations, polymorphs, and
prodrugs, which have the potential to extend market exclusivity of these drugs
by years.44 These patents also facilitate product hopping, in which the brand40. Id. at 866–67.
41. See Peter B. Bach et al., In Cancer Care, Cost Matters, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/opinion/a-hospital-says-no-to-an-11000-a-month-cancerdrug.html (explaining Sloan-Kettering’s decision to stop prescribing Zaltrap in favor for a less expensive
and equally effective drug from the perspective of the prescribers); see also Ziv-Aflibercept, NAT’L
CANCER INST., https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/treatment/drugs/ziv-aflibercept (last updated Mar.
9, 2018) (indicating that Zaltrap is the brand name for ziv-aflibercept).
42. Qualifying for Pediatric Exclusivity Under Section 505A of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act: Frequently Asked Questions on Pediatric Exclusivity (505A), FDA,
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ucm077915.htm (last updated Nov. 30, 2016).
43. Kerstin N. Vokinger et al., Strategies That Delay Market Entry of Generic Drugs, 177 JAMA
INTERNAL MED. 1665, 1665–66 (2017).
44. Tahir Amin & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Secondary Patenting of Branded Pharmaceuticals: A Case
Study
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name manufacturer markets additional products and “hops” their patients over to
those products. For example, seven years after the FDA approved memantine in
2003 for Alzheimer’s disease, it approved an extended-release version of
memantine.45 Then, in 2015, Forest launched the extended-release once-a-day
version to replace the original twice-a-day formulation, announcing also that it
was going to remove the twice-a-day version from the market.46 If the removal
occurred before the generic was introduced, it would have required every patient
to switch over, undermining the market for the soon-to-be-introduced generic.
This attempt at product hopping was blocked by a lawsuit from the New York
Attorney General.47 Patent litigation can also lead to settlements in which the
generic manufacturer agrees to drop the lawsuit in exchange for some valuable
consideration from the brand-name manufacturer. While settlements can be
efficient ways to end litigation, these settlements also prop up weak patents and
delay generic entry.
Other strategies intended to delay generic entry do not directly involve
patents. For example, to garner FDA approval of its a generic drug, a
manufacturer needs to conduct bioequivalent studies showing that its product is
equivalent to the brand-name version. Yet there have reportedly been over 150
cases in which brand-name manufacturers have refused to provide samples to
generic manufacturers for such bioequivalence testing.48 Another delaying
strategy including filing citizen petitions with the FDA.49 Most citizen petitions
related to generic drugs are filed by brand-name manufacturers claiming that
their product has a special characteristic, and thus, the generic should not be
approved, which can have the effect of delaying entry of a generic.50 The
manufacturer for the brand-name oral antibiotic Vancocin filed 24 different
citizen petitions over a period of six years.51
of How Patents on Two HIV Drugs Could Be Extended for Decades, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2286, 2291 (2012).
45. Vincent C. Capati & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Drug Product Life-Cycle Management as
Anticompetitive Behavior: The Case of Memantine, 22 J. MANAGED CARE & SPECIALTY PHARMACY 339,
339–40 (2016).
46. Vincent C. Capati & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Drug Product Life-Cycle Management as
Anticompetitive Behavior: The Case of Memantine, 22 J. MANAGED CARE & SPECIALTY PHARMACY 339,
339–40 (2016).
47. State of New York v. Actavis, 787 F.3d 638, 663 (2015).
48. Kerstin N. Vokinger, et al., Strategies That Delay Market Entry of Generic Drugs, 177 JAMA
INTERNAL MED. 1665, 1666 (2017).
49. See Michael A. Carrier & Carl Minniti, Citizen Petitions: Long, Late-Filed, and At-Last Denied,
66 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 305, 305–06 (2016) (analyzing 505(q) citizen petitions filed with FDA as a form
of under-recognized anticompetitive behavior and concluding that 92% are filed by brand-name
pharmaceutical companies with indicia of their purpose being to delay generic approval).
50. Kerstin N. Vokinger et al., Strategies that Delay Market Entry of Generic Drugs, 177 JAMA
INTERNAL MED. 1665, 1667 (2017).
51. Id.; see also FTC Charges that Shire ViroPharma Inc. Abused Government Processes through
Serial,
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A possible solution that could help with cutting through the thicket of
patents in an economically efficient way is re-examination of patents by the
Patent Trial and Appeals Board, which was created in 2011 to administratively
review patents that had been approved by the Patent and Trademark Office.52
Others ideas include reconsideration of the appropriateness of brand to generic
settlements and passage of CREATES Act, which would make it illegal for
brand-name manufacturers to withhold samples for their products when generic
manufacturers request them.53
C. Multisource period
The final period of a drug’s development course is the multi-source generic
competition period. During this period, the price that a drug achieves is a function
of the amount of competition that exists in the market; that is, simply because a
drug is generic does not necessarily mean that it is inexpensive. The price of a
generic drug depends on the number of competitors that can drive its price down.
One study reviewed the average relative price per dose of a drug based on the
number of manufacturers that were on the market and found that if there is only
one generic manufacturer, the price of the generic version was 87% of the brandname version.54 With two generic manufacturers, the price of the generic was
77% of the brand name’s price, three manufacturers, 60%, and starting when
there are four or more manufacturers on the market, the relative prices of the
generic to the brand-name were 50% or lower. 55
However, some drugs may not have sufficient generic competition to keep
the price down to what might be expected. Our 2016 review of a sample of drugs
that had been approved in the past 25 years and lacked market exclusivity found
that 15% of the drugs had no generic competitors and about a third of them had
three or fewer generic competitors on the market, putting them at risk of

Sham Petitioning to Delay Generics and Maintain its Monopoly over Vancocin HCL Capsules, FTC (Feb.
7, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/02/ftc-charges-shire-viropharma-incabused-government-processes (announcing the filing of a complaint against the manufacturer,
alleging antitrust violations including abusing the citizen petition process in order to delay generic
Vancocin entry to the market).
52. Jonathan J. Darrow et al., The Generic Drug Industry Embraces a Faster, Cheaper Pathway for
Challenging Patents, APPLIED HEALTH ECON. & HEALTH POL’Y, Aug. 2018, at 1–2.
53. S. 974, 115th Cong. (2017).
54. Chintan V. Dave et al., Prices of Generic Drugs Associated with Numbers of Manufacturers,
377 N. ENGL. J. MED. 2597, 2597–98 (2017).
55. Id. at 2597–98. (extrapolating from the data that with each additional manufacturer, the
relative prices decreased at a slower rate).
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shortages, high prices, and acquisition by pharmaceutical entrepreneurs.56
Importation of generics from other well-regulated markets could be a possible
intervention to respond to the lack of a vibrant generic drug market in these
cases.57 In a sample of U.S. drugs that had insufficient competition, about twothirds of them were being produced by at least one other independent
manufacturer in one or more foreign markets.58 Since there is ample evidence
suggesting that drug supplies in other countries are safe, the FDA recently
announced that it was forming a task force to examine this approach.59
Ensuring effective generic competition requires sufficient funding of the
FDA’s Office of Generic Drugs. The office was historically underfunded,
leading to long delays in generic approval times until 2012, when Congress
authorized manufacturer user fees to support generic drug applications. Since
then, the FDA has approved new generics much more quickly and has been able
to review the existing backlog of applications.60 Additionally, the FDA has
recently announced that it will begin to expedite the review of generic
applications to address a lack of effective competition.61 Greater funding can also
support the science of generic drug production to ensure that even complex
products have interchangeable versions available.
V. CONCLUSIONS
One of the common misperceptions about the drug pricing controversies in
the U.S. is that better pricing mechanisms will undercut innovation. As discussed
previously, publicly funded research has helped produce many of our most
56. See Ravi Gupta et al., Generic Drug Approvals Since the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act, 176 JAMA
INTERNAL MED., 1391 1391–93 (Sept. 2016) (referencing the table on page 1392, explaining how 15% of
drugs had no generic competitors and 1/3 had three of fewer generic competitors on the market).
57. See Michael Fralick et al., The Price of Crossing the Border for Medications, 377 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 311, 311–13 (2017) (highlighting past examples and benefits of drug importation into the United
States).
58. See Thomas J. Bollyky & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Can Drug Importation Address High Generic
Drug Prices? 15 tbl.1 (Hutchins Ctr., Working Paper No. 29, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2017/05/wp29_bollykykesselheim_drugimportation.pdf (finding 69 U.S drugs with
insufficient generic competition, of which 44 were made by at least one different manufacturer approved
outside the U.S.).
59. See FDA, STATEMENT FROM FDA COMMISSIONER SCOTT GOTTLIEB, M.D. ON NEW STEPS TO
FACILITATE EFFICIENT GENERIC DRUG REVIEW TO ENHANCE COMPETITION, PROMOTE ACCESS AND
LOWER
DRUG
PRICES
(2018),
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/%20PressAnnouncements/ucm591184.htm. (explaining
the plan to improve the efficiency and predictability of the FDA’s generic review process).
60. Id. at 8.
61. See FDA, STATEMENT FROM FDA COMMISSIONER SCOTT GOTTLIEB, M.D. ON NEW STEPS TO
FACILITATE EFFICIENT GENERIC DRUG REVIEW TO ENHANCE COMPETITION, PROMOTE ACCESS AND
LOWER
DRUG
PRICES
(2018),
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/%20PressAnnouncements/ucm591184.htm. (explaining
the plan to improve the efficiency and predictability of the FDA’s generic review process).
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transformative new drugs, so as long as these funds are maintained, there will
always be sufficient new targets and pathways for later-stage investment.
Second, the recommendations listed above are intended to bring US drug prices
in line with clinical value—that is, to rationalize payment for drugs in the US so
that US patients stop paying exorbitant prices for drugs that offer minimal
clinical impact. Paying for drugs based on their value may mean that there are
some circumstances in which prices will be very high for drugs that offer
substantial gains over existing treatments. But Medicare, Medicaid and other US
payors will be able to better afford to cover such products for the patients who
need them by not wasting vast sums on drugs that do not offer such advantages.
By contrast, in the existing marketplace, incentives for innovation are misaligned
with patient or public health goals because even marginally effective drugs or
incremental improvements can generate substantial revenues. Finally, it is not
clear that indefinite extension of market exclusivity incentivizes innovation. One
study looking at the introduction of novel drugs by brand-name manufacturers
found that the loss of market exclusivity protection was the most important
predictor of the arrival of a new product.62
Another common misperception is that solutions to address unreasonable
prices are politically impossible. Recent surveys have found that three-quarters
of Americans agree that drug costs are unreasonable.63 Prescription drugs are
essential for medical care, can be transformative, and can also take substantial
time and resources to develop. However, high drug prices create burdens for
patients and the health care system. Addressing this issue will require fixing the
lack of effective competition in the market due to market exclusivity and
restrictions on payors that help maintain high prices that are not connected to the
value of the products being sold.

62. Graham Stuart & Matthew Higgins, The Impact of Patenting on New Product Introductions in
the Pharmaceutical Industry, MUNICH PERSONAL REPEC ARCHIVE, AUG. 2007, at 20.
63. See Bianca DiJulio et al., Kaiser Health Tracking Poll: August 2015, THE HENRY J. KAISER
FAMILY FOUND. (Aug. 20, 2015), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/poll-finding/kaiser-health-trackingpoll-august-2015/ (reporting that 72 percent of Americans believed drug costs were unreasonable in a
2015 poll).

